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11 Introduction
In the last two decades an increasing number of countries have eliminated
controls on international capital movements. However, the global economic
crises of recent years have led many economists to reconsider the beneﬁcial
eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization on economic performance. Although the
issue has been widely debated, there are no conclusive results on the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial integration on growth1.
In theory, international ﬁnancial liberalization softens ﬁnancing con-
straints and improves risk-sharing, thereby fostering investments. It may
also have a positive impact on the functioning and development of ﬁnan-
cial systems, and on corporate governance2. These arguments suggest that
we should expect a positive relation between international ﬁnancial liber-
alization and economic growth3. However, the presence of distortions may
reduce the positive eﬀects of liberalization. In fact, information asymmetries
may lead to a bad allocation of capital, and weak ﬁnancial and legal sys-
tems could induce capital ﬂights towards countries with better institutions.
Moreover, banking crises may come along with ﬁnancial liberalization, as it
is well documented in the literature4.
Table 1 shows mean equality tests for growth, ﬁnancial development
and the occurrence of banking crises across diﬀerent treatment (open, bank
crises) and control (closed, no crises) groups of countries, observed annu-
ally between 1975 and 1999. The results suggest that countries without
restrictions on capital account or equity market transactions had, on aver-
age, higher growth rates and ﬁnancial development (as measured by credit
to the private sector as a ratio of GDP). The occurrence of banking crises is
associated with lower growth rates and ﬁnancial development. However, it is
not clear whether there is correlation between openness and the occurrence
of bank crises. When we consider an overall index there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the frequency of crises between countries with and without re-
strictions on capital account transactions. The picture becomes clearer once
we split the index between “systemic” and “non-systemic” banking crises.
1See Edison et al. (2003) for a review of the empirical literature.
2See Klein and Olivei (2000) and Levine (2000) for empirical evidence on the positive
impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth, .
3Evidence on the positive relation between ﬁnancial development and growth is pro-
vided by a large literature (see Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001 for a survey). The results
in La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that good corporate governance spurs growth.
4See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Aizenmann (2002) for a survey.
2Open countries experienced a lower number of systemic crises but a higher
number of non-systemic crises. The higher frequency of non-systemic crises
may be a reason for the concern of economists and governments on the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial liberalization on economic performance.
In this paper we assess empirically the eﬀects of international ﬁnancial
liberalization and banking crises on growth. We admit the possibility that
banking crises come along with ﬁnancial liberalization, as shown by previous
works and by row 5 of Table 1, and investigate their joint impact on growth5.
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Tornell et al. (2004) suggest in diﬀer-
ent ways that institutional quality may matter at shaping the relationship
between ﬁnancial liberalization, crises and long-run growth6.T h e r e f o r e ,w e
control for institutions and their interactions with ﬁnancial openness and
crises. To have a better understanding of the mechanism that links the
variables of our interest, we assess whether liberalization and crises aﬀect
growth through ﬁnancial depth. Also in this case, we control for institu-
tional quality. Inspired by the results in Acemoglu and Johnson (2003)7,w e
distinguish between institutions aimed at contractual as opposed to property
rights protection.
The empirical analysis is performed on a panel dataset that covers 90
countries over the period 1975-1999. We adopt the Dynamic Panel Data
approach proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). We use two indicators of ﬁnancial liberalization, that distinguish
between capital account and equity market liberalization.
Our results show that capital account liberalization has a positive eﬀect
on growth, once we control for banking crises, whose impact is negative.
The absence of capital account controls is good for growth because it fosters
ﬁnancial development and mitigates the harmful eﬀects of banking crises.
Capital account liberalization allows ﬁrms to raise funds more easily on the
5Causality between ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises is left aside from our
empirical analysis.
6Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) show evidence that equity market liberalization
brings about ﬁnancial chaos in the short-run, but has positive long-run eﬀects, since it in-
duces changes in institutions supporting the functioning of the domestic ﬁnancial market.
Tornell et al. (2004) suggest that liberalization and crises aﬀect growth through ﬁnancial
development; given ﬁnancial openness, good institutions make bank crises less likely, and
foster capital inﬂows.
7Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) show that contractual protection aﬀects ﬁnancial struc-
ture more than property rights protection, but has limited eﬀects on economic perfor-
mance. Vice versa, property right protection aﬀects GDP growth, productivity and in-
vestments, but not the ﬁnancial structure.
3international ﬁnancial markets, and thus suﬀer less from domestic crises.
Moreover, banking crises turn out to be less harmful for growth in countries
where property and contractual rights are better protected. Equity mar-
ket liberalization instead has a strong direct eﬀect on growth and does not
interact with banking crises.
There are many contributions in the literature on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
liberalization on long-run growth. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2003) is
the closest work to this paper. These authors as well consider both capital
account and equity market liberalization, and control for bank crises. They
also allow for heterogeneity in the eﬀects of liberalization depending on
cross-country diﬀerences in institutional quality. The main elements that
distinguish our contribution are the attention to the interaction between
ﬁnancial liberalization and bank crises, the analysis of the mechanism that
links them to growth through ﬁnancial development and the use of a diﬀerent
dynamic panel data technique.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the econometric model and the variables we used. Section 3 reports the
estimation results and comments on them. Section 4 councludes.
2 Data and empirical strategies
2.1 The econometric model
We assess the growth eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises by
adding these variables to a dynamic version of the standard growth regres-
sion 8. We follow the dynamic panel data approach suggested by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Bond and Blundell (1998)9. This methodology is pre-
ferred to the cross-sectional regressions because it allows to account for the
impact of the policy changes, imbedded in the indexes of ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion and of crisis episodes, on growth. This dynamic panel technique is also
helpful to amend the bias induced by omitted variables in cross-sectional es-
timates, and the inconsistency caused by endogeneity both in cross-sectional
and static panel (ﬁxed and random eﬀects) regressions.
We formulate the standard neoclassical growth model in a dynamic panel
8See among others, Barro (1997) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin(1995).
9The system-DPD methodology dominates the diﬀerence-DPD proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991) because it amends problems of measurement error bias and weak in-
struments, arising from the persistence of the regressors (as pointed out by Bond et al.,
2001).
4data form, and estimate the following dynamic system:
∆yit = α∆yit−1 + β0∆Xit + δ∆Flibit + γ∆Bcrit + ∆νt + ∆ i,t (1)
yit = αyit−1 + β0Xit + δFlibit + γBcrit + ηi + νt +  i,t, (2)
where time indexes refer to non-overlapping ﬁve-year periods. ∆yit is the
average annual growth rate of real per capita GDP over ﬁve years. yit is
the logaritm of real per capita GDP, and the coeﬃcient on its lag, α = e5λ,
supports conditional convergence if it implies λ<0. Variables indexed by
t − 1 are observed at the beginning of the ﬁve-year period, and covariates
are expressed in period averages. Matrix Xit contains determinants of GDP
growth, such as human capital, population growth and other factors that
account for diﬀerent long-run per capita output across countries. Flibi(t+k,t)
and Bcri(t+k,t) are indicators of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises.
ηi, νt and  it are respectively the unobservable country- and time-speciﬁc
eﬀects, and the error term. The presence of country eﬀe c ti ne q u a t i o n( 2 )
corrects the omitted variable bias. The diﬀe r e n c e si ne q u a t i o n( 1 )a n dt h e
instrumental variables estimation of the system are aimed at amending in-
consistency problems10. We instrument diﬀerences of the endogenous and
predetermined variables with lagged levels in equation (1) and levels with
diﬀerenced variables in equation (2). For instance, we take yit−3 as instru-
ment for ∆yit−1 and Flibit−2 for ∆Flibit in (1) and ∆yit−2 as instrument for
yit−1 and ∆Flibit−1 for Flibit in (2). We estimate the system by General-
ized Method of Moments with moment conditions E[∆yit−s ( it −  it−1)] =
0 for s ≥ 2,a n dE[∆zit−s ( it −  it−1)] = 0 for s ≥ 2 on the predeter-
mined variables z, for equation (1); E[∆yi,t−s (ηi + εi,t)] = 0 and E[∆zi,t−s
(ηi + εi,t)] = 0 for s =1for equation (2). We treat all regressors as predeter-
mined. The validity of the instruments is guaranteed under the hypothesis
that  it are not second order serially correlated. Coeﬃcient estimates are
consistent and eﬃcient if both the moment conditions and the no-serial cor-
relation are satisﬁed. We can validate the estimated model through a Sargan
test of overidentifying restrictions, and a test of second-order serial corre-
lation of the residuals. As pointed out by Arellano and Bond (1991), the
estimates from the ﬁrst step are more eﬃcient, while the test statistics from
the second step are more robust. Therefore, we will report coeﬃcients and
statistics from the ﬁrst and second step respectively.
10See Temple (1999) for a survey on the methodologies used in growth regressions.
52.2 Financial liberalization and ﬁnancial fragility: the data
To explore the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization and banking crises on growth
we need to measure these variables. The literature on ﬁnancial liberalization
has proposed diﬀerent indicators that diﬀer along several directions. The
major distinctions are based on the de iure vs de facto deﬁnition criterion,
the characterization on a zero-one vs continuous scale, and the market they
refer to.
In our analysis we construct an index of liberalization of both capital
account and equity market based on two diﬀerent sources11.T h eﬁrst one is
a dummy variable provided by the IMF in its Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), that is available for
a maximum of 212 countries starting from 196712. T h i si st h em o s tc o m -
monly used measure of restrictions on international ﬁnancial transactions.
It takes value 1 if a country has experienced restrictions on capital account
transactions during the year, and zero otherwise. Our yearly measure of
ﬁnancial liberalization, opIMF, equals 1 and 0 when the IMF dummy is re-
spectively 0 and 1. The second indicator is based on Bekaert et al.’s (2003)
chronology of oﬃcial equity market liberalization, that is available for 95
countries from 1980. Our variable opBHL diﬀers from opIMF because it
only accounts for equity market liberalization, but not for globalization of
the credit market for instance. Moreover, diﬀerently from the AREAER,
Bekaert et al.’s measure does not contemplate policy reversals, so that a
country is labeled as open ever since its ﬁrst year of liberalization. As the
IMF-based indicators, it takes value 1 and zero in case of internationally
open and closed country-years, respectively. Both opIMF and opBHL are
expressed as ﬁve-year averages, thereby taking values in the [0,1] interval.
There are alternative measures that are able to account for diﬀerent de-
grees of liberalization instead of just the presence or absence thereof. Quinn’s
(1997) index scores the intensity of capital account controls on a scale from
0 to 4 with steps of 0.5. However, it is hardly suited for panel studies since
it is available for a signiﬁcant number of countries only for four years, 1958,
1973, 1982 and 1988. Other contributions have used de facto measures, as
11We focus on de iure zero-one measures, that classify a country as ﬁnancially liberalized
if there are no legal restrictions to international trade of ﬁnancial instruments.
12Classiﬁcation methods have changed in 1996, so that there are 13 separate indexes
now, that can hardly be compared to the previous single indicator. Miniane (2000) har-
monized the classiﬁcations, though for a limited number of countries, and over a short
time span. Therefore, the last observation for opIMF in our dataset dates back to 1996.
6data on international capital ﬂo w sa sar a t i oo fG D P .T h ei d e ai st h a ta c -
tual international capital ﬂows are a good proxy for the degree of ﬁnancial
openness. A more comprehensive discussion on the available indicators can
be found in Edison et al. (2002).
Banking crises are subject to various classiﬁcations as well. As for liber-
alization, we adopt a zero-one anecdotal indicator of bank crises, proposed
by Caprio and Klingebiel (2001). The authors keep record of 117 systemic
and 51 non-systemic crises occurred in 93 and 45 countries respectively, from
the late Seventies on. On a yearly base, our variable Bcr takes value 2 if
the country has experienced a systemic banking crisis, meaning that much
or all of a bank’s capital has been exhausted; 1 if the banking crisis involved
less severe losses; and 0 otherwise. We use two alternative data reductions
for robustness analysis: Bcr012 takes value 2 if Bcr equals 2 at least once
over the period, 1 if at least a 1 is scored, zero otherwise. Bcr012av instead
accounts also for the duration of crisis episodes, since it equals the period
average of Bcr.
The other covariates in our growth regressions are variables commonly
accounted for in the empirical growth literature (see Barro, 1997), such as
secondary school attainment, the growth rate of population, government ex-
penditure and investments as a ratio of GDP. Other factors that we want to
take into account are ﬁnancial development, proxied by the ratio of credit
to the private sector over GDP, and, at a further stage of the analysis, insti-
tutional quality, as measured by the government anti-diversion policy index
(Hall and Jones, 1999) and by the indicator of eﬃciency of the judiciary
system (see La Porta et al. 2003). The ﬁrst indicator mainly accounts for
property rights protection, while the other refers more to contractual rights.
The sample consists of data for a maximum of 90 countries over the
period 1975-1999 or 1980-1999 depending on the indicator of ﬁnancial lib-
eralization adopted. Since keeping the larger sample gives us a longer time-
series in the panel analysis, we will go on reporting results from the 1975-99
sample for opIMF and from 1980-99 for opBHL. Since we average over
non-overlapping ﬁve-year periods, either four or ﬁve observations for each
country are available. More detail on the countries in our sample and on all
variables is given in the appendix.
73 Empirical evidence
3.1 Liberalization, banking crises and growth
Table 2 reports results from dynamic-panel estimations of the augmented
growth regression, which includes the usual control variables (initial GDP,
secondary school attainment, population growth, government spending and
investments over GDP) plus indicators of ﬁnancial liberalization, ﬁnancial
development, and banking crises. Consistently with the previous cross-
country growth studies (see Barro, 1997 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995),
we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that countries with lower initial real per capita
GDP have grown faster than the initially richer ones, conditional on the
other variables. Our estimates imply a convergence rate of about 1.5% per
year13. Population growth and investments have the signs predicted by
growth theory (respectively negative and positive) in most of the estimates,
though not always signiﬁcant.
Capital account openness has zero-eﬀect on growth. Equity market lib-
eralization instead exhibits a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient (columns 1 and
5). These results are in line with Bekeart et al.’s (2003) ﬁndings. Using the
same measure of ﬁnancial liberalization, they show that equity market lib-
eralization signiﬁcantly aﬀects growth, while the relation between the IMF
measure and growth is fragile.
As a wide strand of literature (see Aizenmann, 2002 for a survey) points
out, the removal of restrictions on capital ﬂows may expose ﬁnancial sys-
tems to turmoil and possibly crises14. If that is the case, the costly impact
of ﬁnancial crises15, brought about by liberalization, could be responsible
for the coeﬃcient estimates for opIMF in column 1. To control for this hy-
pothesis, we include the bank crisis indicator in the regression of columns 2.
Once we control for the occurrence of bank crises, the positive coeﬃcient for
opIMF becomes signiﬁcant. As expected, banking crises strongly restrain
growth. Moreover, the interaction between capital account openness and
crises in column 3 is positive. This suggests that, irrespective of whether
13The convergence rate is computed as ˆ λ =
ln(ˆ α)
5 .
14Among others, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show that ﬁnancial liberalization of-
ten precedes banking crises, Glick and Hutchison (1999) ﬁnd that ﬁnancially liberalized
emerging market economies are more likely to experience twin crises, Demirguc-Kund
and Detragiache (1998) show that banking crises occur more often in liberalized ﬁnancial
systems.
15A number of papers try to quantify the output costs of ﬁnancial crises. See among
others Edwards (1999), Honohan and Klingebiel (2001), and De Gregorio and Lee (2004).
8ﬁnancial liberalization triggers instability in the banking sector, countries
without capital account restrictions are less prone to the negative eﬀects
of banking crises than ﬁnancially closed economies. Thus, capital account
liberalization has no strong direct eﬀects on growth, but it is important to
mitigate the negative eﬀects of banking crises.
The results are slightly diﬀerent if we restrict the focus on equity market
liberalization. As in Bekeart et al., equity market openness and banking
crises have indeed strong opposite eﬀects, respectively positive and negative,
but the introduction of the crises variable does not aﬀect the eﬀectiveness
of equity market liberalization on growth. Moreover, we ﬁnd no interaction
between the two variables (see column 7). In fact, it is not so surprising
that free international equity trade alone can be less of help in case domestic
banks get into troubles. Firms that rely on credit may be severely hurt by
banking crises, and ﬁnd it diﬃcult to shift abruptly to equity ﬁnancing, even
if they can sell shares on the international market. If instead they have free
access to international credit markets, they might raise funds more easily
there, and thus suﬀer less from domestic crises.
Opposite results are obtained by Eichengreen and Leblang (2002). They
show that the negative eﬀects of domestic crises are neutralized by the pres-
ence of controls on capital controls. One reason could be that they use a
diﬀerent indicator of crises (by Bordo et al., 2001) that encompasses both
exchange and banking crises.
As a robustness check, we replicate the estimations in Table 2 using an
indicator of Banking crises that accounts also for the duration of banking
crises, Bcr012av. Table 5 reports coeﬃcients only for liberalization, bank
crises and their interaction. The results are not remarkably diﬀerent from
the ones we obtained using the discrete crisis indicator.
3.2 Institutions, Financial Liberalization and Growth
After Hall and Jones’ (1999) seminal paper, a wide strand of growth lit-
erature has focused on institutions as a primary determinant of economic
performance. Alfaro et al. (2004) have shown that institutions are an im-
portant determinant of capital inﬂows. Tornell et al. (2004), in line with
this argument, suggest that in ﬁnancially open countries institutional qual-
ity aﬀects both the occurrence of banking crises and the extent of capital
inﬂows. Banking crises may occur as a by-product of openness, as credit
markets get thicker, especially if there is a poor legal environment. In open
9economies, the presence of good institutions facilitates capital inﬂows from
abroad, when domestic banking crises reduce the amount of credit available
to ﬁrms16. As a result, banking crises are expected to be less harmful for
growth in countries where property and contractual rights are better pro-
tected. Symmetrically, ﬁnancial liberalization might turn out to be growth-
restraining in countries with worse institutions. In order to assess empiri-
cally these implication we include interactive terms in our dynamic growth
regressions.
Table 3 shows results from system-GMM estimations that include the
same regressors in columns 1-3 of Table 2, plus the interactions of capital
account liberalization with indicators of institutional quality. We also inves-
tigate the relation between liberalization, ﬁnancial development and overall
economic development17. Institutional quality is proxied here by the gov-
ernment antidiversion policy index constructed by Hall and Jones (1999).
This measure varies between [0,1] and takes higher values for governments
with more eﬀective policies for supporting production18.
Growth is positively aﬀected by ﬁnancial liberalization and negatively by
bank crises under every speciﬁcation of the model. As reported in column
4, the eﬀe c to fb a n kc r i s e si si n d e e dd i ﬀerent across countries with good and
bad institutions. The term that controls for bank crises in institutionally
developed countries is strongly positive. Thus, the cost of banking crises
in terms of growth is reduced by good institutions. The interaction with
capital account openness, inc o l u m n3 ,i sn e g l i g i b l e .
As the interaction with credit market development in Column 1 shows,
ﬁnancial liberalization restrains economic growth in countries with small
credit markets. Thus, studying the eﬀects of capital account openness on
ﬁnancial development might be of help in understanding the transmission
to economic growth. Column 2 shows that banking crises have a bigger
impact in countries with high levels of credit market development. In fact,
if ﬁrms rely more heavily on credit ﬁnancing, they are more severely hurt
by banking crises.
Table 3b replicates the exercise of Table 3 using the equity market liber-
16In Tornell et al. this mechanism works to a diﬀerent extent across tradables and
nontradables sectors. We leave this aspect aside of the analysis.
17Financial development is measured by credit market depth, while the index of overall
economic development is taken from the classiﬁcation in World Development Indicators.
18The index is an equal-weighetd avarage of 5 variables: (i) law and order (ii) bu-
reaucratic quality (iii) corruption (iv) risk of expropriation (v)government repudiation of
contracts.
10alization index. The most signiﬁc a n tr e s u l t ,i nc o l u m n5 ,p o i n t si nt h es a m e
direction as column 5 in Table 3. Good institutions reduce the destructive
eﬀects of bank crises.
Hall and Jones’ (1999) indicator of institutional quality accounts mainly
for property right protection, i.e. the degree of private property protections
against government and elite expropriations. Inspired by Acemoglu and
Johnson (2003), we assess the role of institutions aimed at protecting private
contracts. Thus, we replicate the exercise in Tables 5 and 6 using the degree
of eﬃciency of the judiciary as a diﬀerent measure of institutional quality.
This variable, built by La Porta et al. (2003), captures the legal costs of
contract enforcement and takes values in [0,7].
The evidence in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 shows that contractual pro-
tection does not bring heterogeneity in the eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization
and crises on growth, which remain respectively positive and negative.
3.3 Liberalization, crises and ﬁnancial development
The evidence in the previous sections suggests that bank crises tend to
restrain growth, but to a lesser extent if good institutions and ﬁnancial
openness help channelling funds into the economy. Moreover, column 4 in
Table 2 indicates that capital account liberalization becomes uninﬂuential
for growth, once we control for ﬁnancial depth. These results suggest that
the eﬀect of capital account liberalization on growth is generally positive,
and is possibly transmitted through the credit market. In this section, we
assess how ﬁnancial development (FD)i sa ﬀected by international liberal-
ization and bank crises. To this end, we estimate the following dynamic
system
∆FDit = a∆FD it−1 + b∆Flibit + c∆Bcrit + g∆interactionit + ∆ut + ∆eit
FDit = a(FDit−1)+b(Flibit)+c(Bcrit)+g(interactionit)+hi + ut + eit
with two-step GMM. The coeﬃcients in column 1 of Table 4 strongly support
the hypothesis that capital account liberalization boosts ﬁnancial depth19.
The estimates in columns 2 and 4 show that ﬁnancial liberalization has
t h es a m ee ﬀects across countries with diﬀerent institutional and economic
development. Column 1 does not support the view that bank crises slow
19This result is consistent with previous evidence by Levine (2001) and Klein and Olivei
(2000).
11down the process of ﬁnancial development 20. However, column 3 suggests
that feedback from banking crises to credit market depth may indeed take
place, with the expected positive and negative signs, respectively in countries
with high and low degrees of property rights protection.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 instead suggest that contractual protection
plays a role in shaping the eﬀect of openness and bank crises on ﬁnancial
depth. A good legal environment for business turns bank crises into expan-
sions of the credit markets, consistent with the “bumpy path” proposed by
Tornell et al. (2004). Vice-versa, where contractual rights are weak, credit
markets are restrained by both openness and banking crises.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper provides an enpirical evaluation of the eﬀects of ﬁnancial lib-
eralization and banking crises on growth. Our analysis accounts for the
interaction between liberalization and crises, and allows for unequal eﬀects
across countries with diﬀerent degrees of institutional and economic develop-
ment. We also investigate the transmission of these eﬀects through ﬁnancial
depth.
The overall lesson we draw from the results in section 3 is that the re-
moval of capital account restrictions boosts growth mainly through indirect
eﬀects. In fact, ﬁnancial liberalization has not only a beneﬁcial impact on
ﬁnancial development but also allows to smooth the destructive eﬀects of
ﬁnancial distress. Banking crises are indeed extremely harmful for economic
performance. The cost of crises is higher in countries with bad institutions,
as well as in the closed ones, while they have less impact in liberalized
economies and in countries with higher quality of institutions. The eﬀect of
banking crises on growth is mainly a direct one, even though we show that
feedbacks on credit market development are also possible.
The positive eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization are robust to diﬀerent def-
inition. In fact, we also show a positive relation between equity market
liberalization and growth. Our results, consistent with Bekaert et al.(2004),
point towards a direct eﬀect of equity market integration. However, eq-
uity market openness and banking crises have strong opposite eﬀects but
do not interact. This evidence can be partly reconciled with the mechanism
20Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) also show that ﬁnancial liberalization tend to
push ﬁnancial development while ﬁnancial fragility slows down the process.
12proposed by Tornell et al. (2004). In fact, ﬁrms that rely on credit may
be severely hurt by banking crises, and ﬁnd it diﬃcult to shift abruptly to
equity ﬁnancing, even if they can sell shares on the international market.
If instead they have free access to international credit markets, they might
raise funds more easily there, and thus suﬀer less from domestic crises.
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18Country # opIMF # opBHL # bc2 # bc1 Growth Country # opIMF # opBHL # bc2 # bc1 Growth
Algeria 00 2 0 1 . 1 9 2 Kenia 0 1 9 4 0.377
Argentina 3 1 10 0 0.497 Korea 0 1 3 0 5.828
Australia 12 0 0 4 2.021 Lesotho 0 0 0 12 1.545
Austria 50 0 0 2 . 2 9 6 Malawi 0 0 0 0 1.237
Bangladesh 0 1 10 0 2.174 Malaysia 21 1 3 4 4.020
Barbados 00 0 0 2 . 6 6 4 Mali 0 0 3 0 0.539
Belgium 21 0 0 0 2.039 Mauritius 0 1 0 1 4.257
Benin 00 3 0 0 . 7 6 8 Mexico 7 1 15 0 0.887
Bolivia 16 0 9 0 -0.295 Mozambique 00 9 0 - 2 . 3 6 1
Botswana 01 0 2 5 . 1 0 2 Nepal 0 0 1 0 1.959
Brasil 01 7 0 1 . 2 0 0 Netherlands 19 0 0 0 1.960
Cameroon 0 0 11 0 0.132 New Zealand 12 1 0 4 0.802
Canada 21 0 3 0 1.844 Nicaragua 3 0 11 0 -4.073
Central Africa 0 0 24 0 -2.805 Niger 1 0 17 0 -1.321
Chile 01 7 0 3 . 4 5 9 Norway 1 0 7 0 2.704
Colombia 01 6 0 1 . 5 4 3 Pakistan 0 1 0 0 2.729
Congo 00 8 0 1 . 5 3 1 Panama 21 0 2 0 1.435
Costa Rica 30 1 6 0 . 8 0 5 Papua N Guinea 00 0 1 1 - 0 . 8 5 1
Cyprus 00 0 0 5 . 9 6 8 Paraguay 2 0 5 0 1.673
Denmark 80 0 6 1 . 8 3 8 Peru 91 8 0 - 0 . 6 9 7
Dominican Rep 00 0 0 2 . 7 2 2 Philippines 0 1 9 0 0.736
Ecuador 17 1 9 0 -0.045 Portugal 3 1 0 0 3.042
Egypt 01 5 5 3 . 6 6 1 Rwanda 0 0 0 9 0.084
Table A. Countries, Financial Liberalization and Growth
19Country # opIMF # opBHL # bc2 # bc1 Growth Country # opIMF # opBHL # bc2 # bc1 Growth
El Salvador 00 1 0 - 0 . 0 3 6 Senegal 0 0 4 0 0.003
Fiji 0 0 0 0 1.216 Sierra Leone 0 0 10 0 -2.047
Finland 5 0 4 0 2.007 Singapore 18 0 0 1 5.486
France 6 0 0 2 1.843 South Africa 0 1 0 12 -0.053
Gambia 50 0 7 - 0 . 3 1 0 Spain 2 1 9 0 1.852
Germany 21 0 0 3 2.095 Sri Lanka 0 1 5 0 2.677
Ghana 0 1 8 3 0.212 Sweden 3 0 1 0 1.404
Greece 0 1 0 5 1.253 Switzerland 4 0 0 0 0.968
Guatemala 12 0 0 4 0.485 Syria 0 0 0 0 1.892
Haiti 0 0 0 0 4.066 Thailand 0 1 8 0 4.765
Honduras 8 0 0 0 0.098 Togo 0 0 3 0 -0.967
Hong Kong 21 0 0 6 4.622 Trinidad & Tobago 2 1 0 12 1.620
Iceland 0 1 0 3 2.158 Tunisia 0 1 0 5 2.483
India 0 1 0 7 3.298 Turkey 0 1 4 1 1.688
Indonesia 21 1 3 0 3.801 Uganda 0 0 6 0 1.719
Iran 3 0 0 0 0.504 United Kingdom 17 0 0 22 2.073
Ireland 4 0 0 0 4.324 United States 21 0 0 8 2.404
Israel 0 1 7 0 1.676 Uruguay 15 0 4 0 1.723
Italy 6 0 0 6 2.273 Venezuela 9 1 2 5 -1.046
Jamaica 01 6 0 - 0 . 2 6 8 Zaire 0 0 0 0 -5.585
Japan 16 1 9 0 2.528 Zambia 0 0 1 0 -1.818
Jordan 0 1 0 2 2.141 Zimbabwe 0 1 5 0 0.200
Table A (cont'd). Countries, Financial Liberalization and Growth
20Table B. Variables: deﬁnitions and sources
Variable Deﬁnition Availability Sources
y Beginning of period real per capita GDP yearly, 1975-99 Penn World Tables 6.1
sec25 Percentage of population aged 25 or above 5-year, 1975-99 Barro and Lee (2001)
with some secondary education
grpop average yearly population growth rate yearly, 1975-99 Penn World Tables 6.1
gov government share of y yearly, 1975-99 Penn World Tables 6.1
inv investment share of y yearly, 1975-99 Penn World Tables 6.1
privo Private credit by deposit money banks yearly, 1975-99 Beck et al. (2003)
and other ﬁnancial institutions to GDP
opIMF Equals 0 if restrictions on capital account transactions yearly, 1975-99 AREAER, IMF
are in place, 1 otherwise. n-year period average
opBHL Equals 1 ever since the year of oﬃcial equity market yearly, 1980-99 Bekaert et al. (2003)
liberalization, 0 elsewhere. n-year period average
Bcr Equals 2 if systemic banking crises, 1 if non-systemic yearly, 1975-99 Caprio and Klingebiel
crises, 0 if no crises have occurred in the year. (2003)
Bcr012 Equals 2 if systemic banking crises, 1 if non-systemic CK (2003)
crises, 0 if no crises have occurred in the period
Bcr012av Average of Bcr over the period CK (2003)
GADP Government anti-diversion policy index. Accounts for: law average 1986-95 Hall and Jones
and order, burocratic quality, risk of expropriation, corruption, (1999)
government repudiation of contracts. Values in [0,1]
LDC Dummy for developing countries WDI
eff_jud Assessment of the eﬃciency and integrity of the legal average 1980-83 La Porta et al
e n v i r o n m e n ta si ta ﬀects business, particularly foreign (2003), from ICR
ﬁrms. Values in [0,10]
21Table 1. Financial Liberalization, Banking Crises, Financial Development and Growth
Mean equality tests - 90 countries
Open vs Open vs BC vs Systemic BC Non-systemic




































Period 1975-99 1980-99 1975-99 1975-99 1975-99
This table reports the diﬀerences in mean between treated (open, bank crisis) and control (closed, no bank crisis)
groups, and their standard errors (in parenthesis). ∗∗∗ and ∗∗ indicate rejection of the null of zero-diﬀerence at 1
and 5 % signiﬁcance level. The test is performed on annual data for the countries in Table A. The variables of
interest are the growth rate of real per capita GDP, the growth rate of credit to the private sector, and the 0-1
indicators of occurrence of bank crises.
22Table 2. Financial Liberalization, Bank Crises and Growth
Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM

















































































































opIMF ∗ Bcr012 .064
(.039)
opBHL ∗ Bcr012 .002
(.006)
C o u n t r i e s 9 08 98 98 98 28 18 18 1
Period 1975-99 1975-99 1975-99 1975-99 1980-99 1980-99 1980-99 1980-99
m2 .246 .119 .105 .100 .264 .201 .200 .197
Sargan .418 .635 .677 .713 .160 .381 .541 .660
System-GMM estimates. Dependent variables: log and log-diﬀerence of real per capita GDP. Regressors are log and
log-diﬀerences of: lagged real per capita GDP, secondary attainment, government and investments share of GDP,
indicators of ﬁnancial liberalization and bank crises. Instruments: lagged levels for diﬀerences, lagged diﬀerences
for levels. Two-steps estimations. Coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are from the ﬁrst step.
5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance coeﬃcients in bold and italics. P-values for Sargan overidentiﬁcation test and m2
test for second-order serial correlation of residuals are from the second step.
23Table 3. Capital Account Liberalization, Bank Crises and Growth
Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM - Interactions

























opIMF ∗ privol −.115
(.06)
Bcr012 ∗ privoh .001
(.031)
opIMF ∗ GADPl −.214
(.149)
Bcr012 ∗ GADPh .134
(.068)
opIMF ∗ LDC −.062
(.100)
Bcr012 ∗ (1 − LDC) .058
(.043)
C o u n t r i e s 8 98 98 88 88 98 8
Period 1975-99 1975-99 1975-99 1975-99 1975-99 1975-99
m2 .108 .091 .08 .237 .091 .09
Sargan .670 .623 .568 .300 .487 .405
System-GMM estimates. Dependent variables: log and log-diﬀerence of real per capita GDP.
Regressors are log and log-diﬀerences of: lagged real per capita GDP, secondary attainment,
government and investments share of GDP, capital account liberalization, bank crises and
interactions with ﬁnancial development, insitutional quality, economic development. Subscritps
l and h indicate that the variable is below and above cross-sectional average. Instruments: lagged
levels for diﬀerences, lagged diﬀerences. Two-steps estimations. Coeﬃcients and standard errors
(in parenthesis) are from the ﬁrst step. 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in bold and
italics. P-values for Sargan overidentiﬁcation test and m2 test for second-order serial
correlation of residuals are from the second step.
24Table 3b. Equity Market Liberalization, Bank Crises and Growth
Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM - Interactions

























opBHL ∗ privol −.006
(.007)
Bcr012 ∗ privoh .042
(.026)
opBHL ∗ GADPl .057
(.037)
Bcr012 ∗ GADPh .148
(.064)
opBHL ∗ LDC .005
(.012)
Bcr012 ∗ (1 − LDC) .056
(.035)
C o u n t r i e s 8 18 18 08 08 18 1
Period 1980-99 1980-99 1980-99 1980-99 1980-99 1980-99
m2 .151 .208 .218 .527 .194 .218
Sargan .486 .458 .245 .342 .285 .306
System-GMM estimates. Dependent variables: log and log-diﬀerence of real per capita GDP.
Regressors are log and log-diﬀerences of: lagged real per capita GDP, secondary attainment,
government and investments share of GDP, capital account liberalization, bank crises and
interactions with ﬁnancial development, insitutional quality, economic development. Subscritps
l and h indicate that the variable is below and above cross-sectional average. Instruments: lagged
levels for diﬀerences, lagged diﬀerences. Two-steps estimations. Coeﬃcients and standard errors
(in parenthesis) are from the ﬁrst step. 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in bold and
italics. P-values for Sargan overidentiﬁcation test and m2 test for second-order serial
correlation of residuals are from the second step.
25Table 4. Capital Account Liberalization, Bank Crises and
Financial Development - Dynamic Panel Data - System GMM































opIMF ∗ GADPl −.618
(.439)
Bcr012 ∗ GADPh .602
(.313)
opIMF ∗ LDC −.165
(.342)
Bcr012 ∗ (1 − LDC) .528
(.249)
C o u n t r i e s 7 97 87 87 97 9
Period 75-99 75-99 75-99 75-99 75-99
m2 .216 .275 .384 .276 .185
Sargan .394 .501 .451 .432 .411
System-GMM estimates. Dependent variables: log and log-diﬀerence of
private credit to GDP. Regressors are log and log-diﬀerences of: lagged
private credit to GDP, capital account liberalization, bank crises and
interactions with ﬁnancial development, insitutional quality, economic
development. Subscritps l and h indicate that the variable is below and
above cross-section average. Instruments: lagged levels for diﬀerences,
lagged diﬀerences for levels. Two-steps estimations. Coeﬃcients and
standard errors (in parenthesis) are from the ﬁrst step. 5 and 10 per cent
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in bold and italics. P-values for Sargan test and
m2 test for second-order serial correlation of residuals from the second.
26Table 5. Financial Liberalization, Bank Crises and Growth
Robustness analysis
opIMF Bcr012av opIMF∗ opBHL Bcr012av opBHL∗
Bcr012av Bcr012av




















OLS rows replicate Table 1 (columns 2-3, 6-7) with Bcr012av instead of Bcr012,F E
rows Table 2 (columns 2-3, 6-7), GLS Table 2b (columns 2-3, 6-7), diﬀ-GMM Table 3
(columns 2-3, 6-7), sys-GMM Table 4 (colunms 2-3, 6-7). Standard errors within
parenthesis, 5% and 10%signiﬁcant coeﬃcients respectively in bold and italics.
27Table 6. Capital Account Liberalization, Bank Crises
Financial Development and Growth

























Estimates in column 1-2 replicate columns 4-5 of Table 5, with
eff_jud instead of GADP; column 3-4 replicate columns 2-3
of Table 6. Standard errors in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients respectively in bold and italics.
28